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Philosophy has a dirty little secret and it is this: a whole lot of philosophers have swallowed the mechanistic billiard ball deterministic view of human action—presumably because philosophy assumes that science demands it, and/or because modern attempts to articulate in what free will consists seem incoherent (e.g., that free will might somehow be found in the indeterminacy of subatomic particles). This below-the-surface-purely-academic commitment to mechanistic determinism is a dirty little secret because an honest public commitment would render virtually all that is taught in philosophy departments incomprehensible. Can “lovers of wisdom” really continue to tolerate such a heavy burden of hypocrisy? For it is maximally hypocritical, is it not, to teach ethics, or existentialism, or political philosophy, or critical thinking, or indeed to teach anything at all if one views the bodies of humans as entities determined by forces that are describable entirely under the auspices of physical/chemical laws. The only option, it would seem, to avoid such hypocrisy is to go out of business.  After all, either base metal can be turned into gold, or it cannot. We found out long ago that it cannot, and so alchemy was rightly banished into the dustbin of history. Likewise, either philosophy can enhance the wisdom quotient of its disciples as its name implies, and thus override billiard ball mechanics, or it cannot. And if it cannot, it deserves to follow alchemy to an ignominious end.

Before we go quietly into the night, however, let us reflect upon whether putting on a more finely grained pair of theoretical glasses might yet let us see the possibility of gold in “them there determined hills.” The theoretical focus that I have in mind is one that seeks first to examine an intermediate mode of movement, namely the behavior of our animal friends. It is my contention that, once we understand how the development of consciousness transforms the mere movement of inanimate objects into animate behavior, we will be in a much better position to understand how the development of self-consciousness and language transforms animate behavior into the possibility of cooperative human action.  And from there, we will be in a still better position to see how reasoning—in particular impartial reasoning—can transform the conforming action of self-conscious humans into the possibility of self-legislating autonomous individuals. In a nutshell, then, what I am going to argue is that Kant got it right when he argued that autonomy requires that humans rise above their sensuous nature, but that his portrayal was incomplete in that he failed to take into account the nature of both consciousness and self-consciousness, and therefore failed to see that there were more steps to freedom than just one. 

SO LET US LOOK AT ANIMATE BEHAVIOR      

Pavlov, and after him the entire Behaviorist movement, long ago showed that the configuration of self-propelled animate behavior can best be explained by reference to the geometric sum of environmental appetitive stimuli that elicit approach responses, and environmental aversive stimuli that elicit avoidance responses. This is a seminal claim (seemingly ignored by philosophers) since what Behaviorists are saying is that the behavior of animals, rather than being explained by reference to a push-from-behind mechanistic dynamic requires, instead, a reference to the quasi-magnetic pull of perceived stimuli that emerge with the development of consciousness. And what is important here is that, though the resulting behavior is still utterly determined, it is determined in an entirely different way than the way non-animate objects are determined, as a dog scampering up hill to fetch a ball that is rolling down to it so amply demonstrates. And it is this recognition—that there are different kinds of determinism—that, I will argue, ultimately opens up the way to seeing how freedom in the self-legislative sense is possible. So let us begin.
 
LAYERS OF DETERMINISM 

Step one in the evolutionary change in the “dynamic of movement” of entities that populate our world is, as has already been outlined, the development of consciousness whereby animate beings are freed from the determining forces of physical/chemical laws by being ensnared by the determining perceptual forces of environmental stimuli. Understanding this step is critically important because once we understand step one, step two—or the behavioral impact of the evolution of self-consciousness—becomes readily explainable.  That is, if we adopt the model suggested some time ago by George Herbert Mead​[2]​ and Charles Horton Cooley​[3]​, and later empirically supported by Gordon G. Gallop​[4]​, we can describe self-consciousness as the capacity to perceive one’s self from the point of view of another that emerges as a result of a systematic correlation—either in reality or, more importantly and pervasively, in the imaginative space created by symbolic, i.e., linguistic, interaction—between one’s own behavior and the reaction of others. Thus, if young Johnny is systematically exposed to his mother’s enthusiastic approval of toy-sharing (either through direct experience or through story-telling), in future potential toy-sharing situations, Johnny will generate an image of an approving mother, which, if sufficiently strong, will take control of his behavior. Johnny, in other words, becomes self-conscious when he becomes conscious of the value of his behavior from another’s viewpoint, and the behavioral offshoot of the emergence of this self-consciousness is what psychologists refer to as the development of self-control. 

There are three things of note with regard to this dynamic. The first is that the underlying behavioral influence of self-consciousness is similar to the influence of mere consciousness in that what controls action here is a perceived stimulus, though in the case of self-consciousness, the stimulus is self-generated, and a product of the social rather than the physical environment. The second thing of note is that the associational learning, which for animals transpires in reality, can, for linguistically interacting entities, transpire in the imagination, thus rendering inter-human behavior-modification far more precise and pervasive, yet more invisible. And the third point of note is that, though psychologists refer to this as the development of self-control, in reality what we have here is the emergence of social control. That is, what we have here—if indeed the image of approving Mom elicits a sharing response—is Mommy controlling her child from afar. 

So the question is ”what now”? If fundamental changes in movement through phylogenetic and ontogenetic development occur as a result of entities escaping lower-level determining forces by being ensnared in higher levels of determinism, where do we go from here? If autonomy is the goal, what is the next step that humans need to take in order to free themselves from the determinism of social forces?” 

The answer is that, since social determinism results largely because social others plug into one’s practical reasoning by pairing, through linguistic interaction, an imagined action with an imagined reinforcement (e.g., all good children share their toys), the most effective way to take control of one’s own behavior is to take control over one’s own practical reasoning.  And the only way to do that is to neutralize outside influence, or bias by submitting all of one’s beliefs, opinions, judgments, and—most importantly—the vision of who it is that one wants to become​[5]​, to the objective court of reason and to let the best option, i.e., the one backed by the strongest reasons, win. Autonomy, in other words, requires that humans allow themselves to be determined by the rules of reason.  

Elsewhere​[6]​ I have argued that, contrary to Kant’s internal univeralization test, the best way to ensure impartiality is to reflect upon and “objectively” test one’s own viewpoints against those of actual others. And though this is a critically important issue the details of which will ultimately determine how best to guide others to “think their way to freedom,” what is important here is to demonstrate how impartiality fits into the bigger metaphysical picture, which can be summarized as follows.

Freedom and determinism are not the antagonistic, mutually exclusive positions that they are often portrayed to be. Indeed the possibility of any kind freedom depends, both literally and conceptually, upon the actuality of many layers of determinism. The fact that physical objects move according to physical/chemical laws is the foundational position of determinism, both concretely and conceptually. However, animate beings, precisely because they are also determined by the stimulus environment in which they move, are—to a greater or lesser extent—freed from the universal determining power of physical/chemical laws (e.g., they can move up hill). On still another level, symbolically interacting self-conscious entities, precisely because they are also determined by the values that they introject from symbolically interacting others, are—to a greater or lesser extent—freed from the determining power of behavioral laws (e.g., I can share my chocolate cake). And finally, linguistically interacting self-conscious agents, who strive for impartiality by submitting to the determining rules of practical reasoning, free themselves from the determining power of social influence (e.g., I can override introjected values that seem contrary to the individual I hope to become) and, in so doing, make autonomy, and its existential counterpart, individuality, possible.​[7]​

“But is this really real freedom?” one might finally ask. “Is flying from conformity into the freedom of impartiality good enough?” The answer I suggest is: “How much better freedom do you want than the freedom to genuinely listen to the merits of opposing viewpoints in an effort to reach an impartial judgment?” From a societal point of view, if a sufficient number embrace this process, Kant’s Kingdom of Ends will be within our visionary ideal. And from an individual point of view, we can expect, again as Kant pointed out, that since agents will no longer simply blow whichever way the winds blow, and since they will recognize that their decisions, judgments, opinions, and overall vision of who it is that they want to become are a product of their own reasoning rather than a result of societal influence, individuals who consistently strive to view and judge impartially will flourish in a sense of dignity that is well deserved. 
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